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THE NEW ANTITRUST H[STORY*
DANIEL R. ERNST**

I. INTRODUCTION

In his review of legal history published prior to 1960, William Nelson
concluded that almost all of that literature shared a common understanding
of the uses of history.' Legal history, its practitioners agreed, was to be
written by and for the legal profession. The source of their near unanimity
was the conviction that-in contrast with all other historians-the product of
their labor was of immediate juridical significance. Nelson turned to Max
Radin to illustrate his point about the legal historians' conflation of law
and history. "Lawyers [are] necessarily historians,"2 Radin wrote. "[T]hey
derive their law from precedent, which is pure history, and they.., seek
to interpret statutes by considering the conditions under which the statute
arose and was framed, which is also pure history."3
Radin described what I will call "the professional paradigm" in
American legal history.4 Driven by canons of common-law, statutory or
constitutional reasoning, the professional paradigm assumes that the legal
past speaks authoritatively to the legal present. Sometimes historians
writing in this tradition directly invoke the authority of the past, as in an
appeal to the original understanding of a statutory or constitutional text.
Sometimes the authority is more subtle and general, as when a legal
historian discovers a "tradition" running through the American past and

* Presented at a conference entitled Observing the Sherman Act Centennial: The Past
and Future of Antitrust As Public Interest Law, sponsored by the faculty and Law Review
of New York Law School (Nov. 16, 1990).
** Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I wish to thank
Hendrik A. Hartog and Peter C. Carstensen for their comments on an earlier version of this
essay.
1. See W. NELSON & J. REID, THE LrERATURE OF AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (1985).

2. Id at 1 (quoting M. RADIN, THE LAW AND You 188 (1950)).
3. Id; see also Botein, Scientific Mind andLegal Matter: The Long Shadow of Richard
B. Morris's Studies in the History of Law, 13 REV. AM. HIST. 303, 303-15 (1985)
(recognizing the key role academic lawyers play in writing legal history); Gordon,

Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in American Legal
Historiography, 10 LAW & SOC'Y REV.9, 34-35 (1975) (stressing the relevance of social,
as well as legal, history in judicial decision making).

4. For the place of the paradigm in recent legal history, see Katz, The Problem of a
Greene & J. Pole eds.
ColonialLegal History, in COLONIAL BRITISH AMERICA 459-60 (J.
1984).
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then deploys it as a rhetorical buttress for conclusions arrived at by other
means.
In whatever form, the professional paradigm encourages legal
historians to search out continuities between the past and the present. A
finding that the past was fundamentally discontinuous with the present, that
behind the smooth wall of the familiar in the past lay a vast cavern of
difference, would undercut the persuasiveness of appeals to history. The
more the assumptions of past legal actors are revealed as different from our
own, the less convincing become the reasons for privileging their
intentions. Good, legal-process-oriented grounds might remain for
following old legal texts long after the death of the systems of meaning
and interest in which they were fashioned, but an important part of the
authority of the past would be lost.'
Since 1960, the professional paradigm has lost its hold on legal
history, taken as a whole. In part, the toppling of "lawyers' legal history"
was the work of professionally trained historians who discovered that our
legal past could serve as an admirable staging ground for far-ranging
explorations of American culture and society. The revolt was also part of
a rebellion within legal academia against traditional canons of legal
reasoning. Morton Horwitz's searing indictment of what he called the
"conservative tradition" in American legal history is perhaps the best
illustration of this development.' Horwitz accused devotees of the
professional paradigm with turning the legal past into a weapon of
legitimation and reducing legal history to "the pathetic role of justifying
the world as it is."'
Long after the professional paradigm had been dethroned in the larger
discipline, it continued to govern the legal history of antitrust. It has only
been within the last five years that a burst of quite stunning work has
revolutionized the field, bringing to it a methodological sophistication
unsurpassed in legal history today. The work on the so-called formative era
alone deserves a full-blown review essay, but my aims here are more
limited. First, I want to show how the new antitrust legal history parts
company with older work on the formative era. I then want to venture
some thoughts on why the new work nonetheless offers valuable insight for
anyone who seeks to formulate a public interest in antitrust law today.

5. For the legal-process arguments in favor of an originalist approach to statutory
interpretation, see Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479,
1523-38 (1987). Eskridge convincingly rejects such arguments when the statute in question
is "old and generally phrased and the societal or legal context of the statute has changed in
material ways"-an apt description of the Sherman Act. Id at 1481.
6. See Horwitz, The Conservative Traditionin the Writing ofAmerican Legal History,
17 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 275 (1973).
7. Id at 281.
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II.

ANTITRUST HISTORY AND THE PROFESSIONAL PARADIGM

Five years ago, the antitrust lawyer looking for accounts of the
formative era would be unlikely to find one premised on discontinuity
between the past and the present. Even as rich an account as Hans
Thorelli's landmark study The Federal Antitrust Policy,8 published in
1955, looked to the years 1890 to 1904 for the "origination and
institutionalization"9 of a tradition that was still living and vital in
Thorelli's own day. Indeed, Thorelli's antitrust was not simply an
American tradition, it was a major component of "the American tradition,"
which Thorelli identified as the ideals of equality, opportunity, freedom of
enterprise, individualism, and capitalist democracy.) ° Born of "generations
of common law and frontier experience," the antitrust tradition did not
simply survive the merger movement of the turn of the twentieth century,
it "emerged substantially reinforced from the encounter."" By 1904 it
had "conclusively established itself as an important institution in American
life and public policy."12 In Thorelli's day antitrust remained "a living
symbol of economic egalitarianism" and "an accepted way of life in the
United States to an extent rarely experienced elsewhere."13 By asserting
of the American experience, by searching out
the exceptional nature
"general norm[s]" a and "widespread concepts," 5 and by simultaneously
celebrating free enterprise and an activist state, Thorelli's book fit in
16
perfectly with the consensus history and cold war culture of the 1950s.

8. H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN
TRADITION (1955).

Id. at 3.
10. Id. at 608 (emphasis added).

9.

11. IlL
12. Id& at 4.
13. Id. at 609.
14. Id at 1.

15. Id.
16. See generally Lears, A Matter of Taste: Corporate Hegemony in a MassConsumption Society, in RECASTING AMERICA: CULTURE AND POLITICS IN THE AGE OF
COLD WAR 38 (L. May ed. 1989) (the atmosphere was one of democratic interest groups
competing in an extraordinarily fluid social structure, and an emerging cultural consensus
based on the spread of affluence and promise of upward mobility); Noble, The
Reconstruction of Progress:Charles Bear4 Richard Hofttadter, and Postwar Historical
Thought, in RECASTING AMERICA, supra, at 61 (at the end of World War H the history

profession found a new way of comprehending the American past; Richard Hofstadter
"served as a midwife" to the two reigning ideas in postwar academic thought: a national
identity rooted in consensus and a polity best served by social scientists removed from an
irrational democratic tradition).
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Published a decade later, William Letwin's Law and Economic Policy
in America 7 did nothing to challenge the professional paradigm. Letwin
also thought the fundamental nature of antitrust policy was fixed within
decades of its creation (by 1914, in Letwin's case), but he presented a
much less flattering account of the antitrust tradition. In Letwin's telling,
the Rule of Reason cases of 1911 and the Clayton and Federal Trade
Commission Acts of 191420 saddled federal antitrust policy with mutually
inconsistent goals and a complex and fragmented scheme of
enforcement.2 By stressing the irremediably conflicted and incoherent
nature of the antitrust tradition, Letwin's book, like Thorelli's, was also in
keeping with its time. In particular, it joined a far-ranging attack on the
pluralist model of the regulatory state mounted by economists, political
scientists, and professors of administrative law.'
After Letwin, the professional paradigm and the presumption of
continuity continued to dominate antitrust legal history. Robert Bork's
depiction of the drafters of the Sherman Act as adherents to neoclassical
economics" was only the most brazen and anachronistic resort to the
authority of the past in a contemporary debate over antitrust policy. So
strong were the attractions of the professional paradigm that even some of
Bork's fiercest critics shared his understanding of historical utility and
asserted a fundamental continuity between the formative era and the
present. For example, Robert Lande quite effectively pilloried Bork for
failing to acknowledge the variety of social, moral, and political goals held
by the drafters of the Sherman Act, including the preservation of individual
17. W. LErwIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLCY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE

(1965).
18. Id at 278.
19. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
20. Clayton Act, ch. 323, §§ 1-26, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12-36 (1988)); Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, §§ 1-11, 38 Stat. 717 (1914)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1988)).
21. W. LETWIN, supra note 17, at v-vi, 278, 281-82.
22. See generally McCraw, Regulation in America: A Review Article, 49 Bus. HIST.
REV. 159 (1975) (surveying the understanding of regulatory commissions in American
history and evaluating relevant literature in history, economics, political science, and law).
23. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 61-63
(1978); see also Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON.
7 (1966). I intend by the brevity of my treatment of Bork's interpretation to second Rudolph
Peritz's call for a halt to Bork-bashing, made in Peritz, A Counter-HistoryofAntitrust Law,
1990 DUKE LJ. 263, 282 n.72. For able examples of the genre, see Flynn, The Reagan
Administration's Antitrust Policy, 'Original Intent" and the Legislative History of the
Sherman Act, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 259 (1988); Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance
of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. RaV. 1219, 1228-35 (1988).
SHERMAN ANTITRUST Acr
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entrepreneurship, local control over business, and a political process
untainted by the giant business enterprise.' Yet Lande was too wedded
to the professional paradigm to be satisfied with such an unruly historical
record. He insisted that "Congress intended to subordinate all other
concerns to the basic purpose of preventing firms with market power from
directly harming consumers."' Thus, no less than Bork, Lande fashioned
a usable
past and asserted its controlling authority for present-day antitrust
26
cases.

M.

THE NEW ANTITRUST HISTORY:

A

SAMPLING

Change finally came to the writing of antitrust legal history from
scholars who were willing to engage in a less one-sided and exploitive
dialogue with the formative years. The professional paradigm encouraged
legal historians to overlook the fact that the meanings of words and actions
were in important respects fixed by the time and place in which they
transpired. Encountering some historical debate, adherents to the
professional paradigm picked a winner and enlisted it in a contemporary
controversy. In contrast, the new antitrust historians tried to learn from the
debate as a whole and to take it on its own terms, to ask why it ran the
course it did, who pushed it along, who opposed it, and what structures
guided the participants' perceptions of their needs and interests.27
James May's work is one illustration of my point. Like Thorelli and
Letwin, May investigates a "formative period" defined by developments in
antitrust doctrine and enforcement. 2' His period, however, is somewhat
wider, running from 1880 to 1918, because he wants to take in what he
calls "the other half of antitrust."29 This is antitrust as it was promoted
by judges and legislators in the states, where aggressive policy making and
enforcement started earlier and lasted longer than on the federal level."
More important than May's chronology, however, is his search for
difference in the past. This started as an attempt to rescue late nineteenth

24. See Lande, Wealth Transfer as the OriginalandPrimaryConcern ofAntitrust: The
Efficiency InterpretationChallenged,34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 83 (1983).
25. Id. at 68-69.
26. See id. at 81. Others who have noted the shared premisis of Bork and Lande's
work include Flynn, supra note 23, at 291, 304-06, and Millon, supra note 23, at 1235 n.64.
27. For a general discussion of this methodology, see D. RoDGERs, CONTESTED
TRTHS: KEYWORDS IN AMERICAN POLUTcs SINCE INDEPENDENCE 3-16 (1987).

28. See May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era: The
Constitutionaland ConceptualReach of State Antitrust Law, 1880-1918, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
495, 495-97 (1987).
29. ld, at 497.
30. Id at 497-507.
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century jurists from the condescension of Robert Bork and Thomas

McCraw, who implied that the judges lacked any "real" economic

theory.3 1 May concluded to the contrary: the judges of the late 1800s
employed a powerful overall theoretical conception of the economy, but its
meaning and
persuasiveness were lost on modem judges and
32
economists.
At this point, May was principally interested in demonstrating the
distinctive nature of highbrow economic theory in the formative era. This
is, to be sure, a useful and important window on the history of antitrust in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as the work of Herbert
Hovenkamp, Rudolph Peritz, and David Millon also demonstrates.33 Yet
considered apart from more diffuse cultural assumptions and the
circumstances that attracted proponents to a particular economic theory,
highbrow economic thought can provide only a partial view on antitrust.
Such an approach might well miss the extent to which nineteenth century4
Americans saw in trusts an immediate threat to the democratic process.
It might also miss an insight that Richard Hofstadter made central to his
writings on antitrust: middie-class Americans thought of the economy as
something other than an abstract, amoral construct and something more
than an efficient producer of goods and services.35 It was also, Hofstadter
wrote, "a kind of disciplinary machinery for the development of character,"
a teacher of virtues, like diligence, thrift, and calculation.36 Trusts

31. Id at 555-58 (discussing R. BORK, supra note 23, and T. McCRAW, PROPHETS OF
REGULATION

(1984)).

32. Id at 570-71, 589-90.
33. See Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of Industrial Organization,
68 TEX. L. REV. 105 (1989); Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of
Competition, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1019 (1989); Millon, supra note 23, at 1263-75; Peritz, The
Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law: The Property Logic in Restraint of Competition, 40
HASTINGS L.L 285, 305-13 (1989).
34. David Millon's work, which reveals a great appreciation of the political side of
antitrust, is discussed infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
As good as the legal historians' recent work on antitrust and the history of economic
thought is, it could have been better had it more carefully specified the structures through
which the new economic learning passed into legal or general discussions of antitrust.
Without some investigation of this issue, we cannot assess claims of a causal relationship
between changes in economic and legal thought which might, after all, result from
independent but parallel developments in the two disciplines. This is another respect in
which legal historians have something to learn from M. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE
RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERiCAN CAPITALISM, 1890-1916: THE MARKET, THE LAW AND
POLrIcs (1988).
35. R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 10 (1955).
36. Id at 10-11; see also R. HOFSTADTER, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?,
in THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLmcs AND OTHER ESSAYS 188, 199-200 (1965).
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threatened this engine of economic morality by upsetting its mechanism of
rewards and penalties.37
What makes May's second major article so exciting is its location of
antitrust within the fullest possible context in American culture.38 May
ranges across state and federal antitrust law and the major landmarks of
laissez-faire constitutionalism to show how they all shared "a widely
accepted general frame of reference," embodying "fundamental
perspectives on politics, economics, and judicial methodology."3 9 He
captures the extent to which Victorian and many Progressive Era judges
were judicial moralists, "guardians of a free political and economic order,"
which they thought "naturally tended to produce harmonious, just, and
In both
optimal results for both individuals and society at large."'
antitrust and constitutional cases (and, as I can attest from my own work,
cases involving the law of industrial disputes), the judges repeatedly
affirmed "the basic, traditional rights of labor, property, and exchange, and
the fundamental, related principles of competition and 'nondiscretionary'
adjudication."41
For my purposes, the important thing to note about May's work is how
clearly it breaks with the professional paradigm and how thoroughly it
must disappoint the lawyer in search of an immediately usable past. May
writes that "none of the differing 'schools' of antitrust analysis and practice
can accept even implicitly the full formative era vision!';" the best they
can do is appropriate one part or another of it and inflate it into a
distortion of the original intent. His principal finding is discontinuity with
the so-called formative era-changes "so fundamental and so pervasively
accepted that it appears impossible now to adopt an 'original intent'
jurisprudence embracing the full range of formative era hopes and
assumptions."43

David Millon updated Hofstadter's insights in this respect, by relating the passage of the
Sherman Act to recent work on the republican and free-labor ideologies in eighteenth and
nineteenth century America. See Millon, supra note 23, at 1236-47.
37. R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 35, at 10-11.

38. See May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in
ConstitutionalandAntitrustAnalysis,1880-1918,50 OHIo ST. L.J. 257,258, 391-92 (1989);
see also D. Ernst, The Lawyers and the Labor Trust: A History of the American AntiBoycott Association 11-46 (1989) (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University).
39. May, supra note 38, at 258.

40. Id
41. Id at 392.
42. Id at 394.
43. Id at 395.
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David Millon's fine study of the Sherman Act has the same effect."
Like the other new antitrust historians, Millon effectively pillories Robert
Bork's interpretation of the formative era and summarizes the highbrow
economic thought on the problem of monopoly.45 Like May, Millon
updates Hofstadter's interpretation of antitrust law with ample references
to the large literature on republicanism and free labor produced by
American historians.' Millon rejects the professional paradigm no less

emphatically than May. He investigates the Sherman Act, not to locate the
origins of present policy, but to discover "the dying words of a tradition

that aimed to control political power through decentralization of economic
power, which in turn was to be achieved through protection of competitive
opportunity."47 His aim is "to describe the Sherman Act's meaning
within its contemporary intellectual context, rather than to hypothesize

about how Congress as a group thought it should be applied in the future,"
and he lists objections to the premising of a historical work on the
"fictitious construct" of legislative intent.
A final exemplar of the new antitrust history, and by any reckoning the
most important, is Martin Sklar's CorporateReconstruction of American
49 Perhaps our best approach
Capitalism.
to the book is through the
question of periodization. As we have seen, the conventional reason for
treating the decades around 1900 as a distinct period in the history of

44. See Millon, supra note 23.
45. I at 1231-35, 1263-71.
46. Id at 1238-47; see also May, supranote 38, at 272-83. For an earlier interpretation
of antimonopolism as a part of the republican and free-labor traditions, see GerstIe, Book
Review, 27 LAB. HIST. 289 (1986) (reviewing S.PioTr, THE ANTI-MONOPOLY PERSUASION:
POPULAR RESISTANCE TO THE RISE OF BIG BUSINESS INTHE MIDWEST (1985)).
47. Millon, supra note 23, at 1220.
48. Id at 1223-24. One potential pitfall in May's and Millon's attempts to reconstruct
the "shared understandings" of antitrust policymakers in the formative era is the danger of
exaggerating the degree of consensus of late nineteenth century Americans on the problem
of monopoly. Though both are aware of this problem (see in particular id at 1224 n.13),
Rudolph Peritz is surely right to alert readers to the "neoconsensual" implications of May's
and Millon's work. Peritz's own studies make clear that legal apologists of industrial
concentration did not need to await the arrival of some massive paradigm shift in economic
and political thought to find arguments for their corporate clients. See Peritz, supra note 23,
at 313, 316; Peritz, supra note 33, at 291-313. Thus, the eminent Wall Street lawyer
William D. Guthrie argued that the Sherman Act, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), was an
unconstitutional violation of liberty of contract by turning the rhetoric of "free labor" back
upon the advocates of vigorous antitrust law. Guthrie, Unconstitutionall:The Sherman Trust
Act is in Conflict with the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, N.Y.
Sun, Apr. 11, 1897, § 2, at 1, col. 1.
49. M. SKLAR, supra note 34.
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antitrust turns on developments within the legal system. Thus, Thorelli
ended his work in 1904 because by that time the judiciary had decisively
interpreted the commerce clause so as to pose no fundamental bar to
antitrust policy, the Northern Securities case ° had established "the wide
scope and great potentialities"" of the Sherman Act, and the federal
executive had committed itself to the vigorous enforcement of the nation's
antitrust laws.52 By adopting the label "formative era," antitrust historians
implicitly endorse this "internalist" scheme of periodization.
May's and Millon's work shows that alternate schemes of
periodization exist. May, for example, implicitly adopts an internalist
scheme of periodization by using the label "formative" and looking to state
law and practice to set the temporal bounds of his study. 53 Yet his finding
that those same years were a time when distinctive cultural assumptions
reigned suggests an alternate basis for treating his years as a unique period
in antitrust history. By looking beyond the law, May and Millon suggest
that the three or four decades around 1900 were distinctive less for the
clearing of a constitutional hurdle or the creation of the Antitrust
Division' than for (in May's words) the "powerful, widely shared vision"
of the lawmakers and law enforcers. This approach suggests a
periodization based less on the formation of key legal doctrines and
institutions than on a transformation in American culture. If the years
marked the formation of one period in antitrust policy, they also marked
the conclusion of another.
Like May and Millon, Sklar breaks with the periodization of the
professional paradigm by looking beyond the law to find what was
distinctive about antitrust during the years 1890 to 1916. As I read it, his
answer subsumes May's and Millon's work by treating the vision they
recover as the expression of a retreating social order placed on the
defensive by a rising class of managerial capitalists. Once again, the years
around 1900 appear as a transformative era-a corporate reconstruction of
American capitalism from a stage characterized by proprietary firms and

50. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (holding merger of
previously competing firms an illegal combination in restraint of trade under the Sherman
Act).
51. H. THORELLI, supra note 8, at 4.
52. Id. at 3-4.

53. See May, supra note 38, at 259, 392, 395.
54. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice was created in 1903 to
empower the United States Attorney General to bring criminal and civil proceedings in the
federal district courts pursuant to the Sherman Act. J. BURNs, A STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST
LAWS: THEmR ADMINISTRATION, INTERPRETATION, AND EFFECT 65 (1958).
55. May, supra note 38, at 391.
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fierce competition to one dominated by corporations and oligopolistic,
"administered" markets.5 6
Sklar's great contribution to the new antitrust history is his convincing
specification of the mediating structures between social and cultural change
and developments in the law of antitrust. To date, most antitrust historians
have been content to point out simultaneous developments in "law" and
distinct economic, social, and cultural spheres, and to assert rather than
demonstrate a causal connection between the two. This approach gives the
impression that legal change is the result of an essentially consensual and
functional swapping of one paradigm for another, rather than the product
of human agency or a social movement.5 7 Not so with Sklar. The
corporate reconstruction of American capitalism was the conflict-laden
project of a group of self-conscious, struggling individuals who shared a
common social outlook-no less than the revolution in gender roles in the
1960s was the project of the women's movement. Corporate liberals fought
their struggle on many fronts: in economic markets, law and jurisprudence,
party politics, governmental policy and legislation, foreign policy making,
highbrow economic theory, and popular culture. ' Though they
accommodated and made limited concessions to the older, proprietary
forces and such new centers of power as organized labor, they succeeded
in convincing a decisive portion of American society that the public
interest lay in a system of administered markets and in governmental
regulation that was fundamentally supportive of the new corporately
organized order. 59
IV.

LEGAL HMSTORY AM THE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST

The sweep and subtlety of Sklar's book deserve much more comment
than this bald summation, but perhaps even this account suffices for my
main point: the history of antitrust law has decisively broken with the
pursuit of legislative intent which had so long characterized the field.
Given that the new antitrust historians no longer premise their work on the
immediate juridical significance of their findings, what alternate

56. M. SKLAR, supra note 34, at 3.
57. Mark Tushnet has also remarked on this aspect of recent structuralist legal history,
which produces a "'comparative statics' of legal thought," but no "truly historical
understanding of the dynamics of transformation." Tushnet, Introduction, 1990 DUKE L.J.
193, 196 (introduction to an issue of essays on the "Frontiers of Legal Thought"); see also
Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to Its Origins and Underpinnings, 36 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 505, 512 (1986).
58. M. SKLAR, supra note 34, at 11-14.
59. Id at 431-41.
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understanding of historical utility do they endorse? And if the new
antitrust historians do not claim to have produced "something a future
court may need or use,"' why should lawyers and other policy makers
bother with it?
As it happens, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., provided one answer to
these questions in The Path of the Law,61 when he sketched out a critical,
delegitimating place for history in legal education. Holmes saw history as
a vehicle for recognizing contingency in the legal system. It fostered an
"enlightened skepticism" toward law and the "deliberate reconsideration of
the worth" of legal rules.6 2 Legal history, Holmes wrote, was a way of
luring "the dragon out of his cave" so that one could "count his teeth and
claws, and see just what is his strength."63 The fact that things were not
always as they appear implies that things are not as fixed and determined
as they seem. A timeless, rock-solid certainty can suddenly become a timebound and artificial convention. Claims, explicit or otherwise, that a
particular regime is simply a natural outgrowth of the past are revealed as
problematic, and a defense of the continuing utility of the regime can be
demanded."
One aim of the new antitrust history, then, is negative and critical. It
aims at debunking positivistic claims on behalf of present-day antitrust
policy by revealing alternate understandings of the aims of antitrust, and
then investigating why some understandings succeeded while others were
marginalized or cast aside.' Valuable as this debunking function is, can
some stronger claim be advanced on behalf of the new antitrust history?
Is it simply a serviceable implement for clearing ground, but of no help in
reconstructing the goals of antitrust law?
Holmes's answer in The Path of the Law is not heartening for a
legal historian who aspires to some more dignified function than dragon
bait. For once the creature was out in the open, Holmes would leave it to

60. The quoted language is from a classic statement of the professional paradigm, J.
GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK: A STUDY IN

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1664-1776) at xxxiii-iv (1944).
61. O.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167 (1920).

62. Id. at 186-87.
63. Id. at 187.
64. Robert Gordon and Morton Horwitz subtly explored what Horwitz termed "the
essentially destabilizing and subversive" function of legal history in Gordon, Historicism in

Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017, 1020-24 (1981), and Horwitz, The Historical
Contingency of the Role of History, 90 YALE W. 1057, 1058 (1981).
65. As Peritz writes, the new work "historicizes the prevailing view and then reaches

back in time to recover arguments, policies, and visions eclipsed by the ascendancy of new
views and by the passage of time." Peritz, supra note 23, at 314.
66. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 61.
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that "man of the future... the master of economics, [to] kill him, or to
tame him and make him a useful animal."' Richard Posner, for one, was
quick to accept Holmes's offer of the role of St. George. As Posner has
recently written, today the Sherman Act "means, not what its framers may
have thought, but what economists and economics-minded lawyers and
judges think."
Can legal historians concede that the Sherman Act
means other than what its framers thought it meant and still assert some
role for themselves in the formulation of antitrust law and policy?
They can, though their contribution is one that lawyers have not
always prized since Holmes defined their task as the prediction of judicial
behavior.' The professional paradigm reigned so long because it
professed to help lawyers with that job, premised as it was on the
assumption that the authority of the drafters, framers, or precedents should
control the decisions of today's lawmakers. Economics and the other social
sciences also claim predictive power, so their assimilation into legal
academia was quite rapid. To my mind, what makes the new antitrust
history new is its embrace of what I consider the basic premise of the
humanities-that expanding our understanding of the way life can go can
provide us with insight which, while lacking direct predictive power, is
nonetheless invaluably suggestive." To paraphrase Clifford Geertz, the
basic aim of the new antitrust history is not to answer once and for all the
fundamental questions of antitrust policy, but to discover how others have
answered those questions and why they chose to answer as they did.7 1
Almost a decade ago, Robert Gordon suggested that the new approach
to legal history, which has been so long in coming to the history of
antitrust, accepted what he called "a kind of reverse Faustian bargain": the
"sacrifice of immediate influence in the councils of the great for a
potentially enormous increase in understanding of our condition."72 The
new antitrust historians have made a similar pact. By giving up the
professional paradigm, they have eschewed legal history's traditional role

67. Id. at 187.
68. Posner, Legal Formalism,Legal Realism, andthe Interpretationof Statutes and the
Constitution,37 CASE W. REs. L. Rav. 179, 209 (1986).
69. See O.W. HOLMES, supra note 61, at 167; see also Grey, Holmes and Legal
Pragmatism,41 STAN. L. REv. 787 (1989) (noting Holmes's specific account of legal rules
as predictors of judicial decisions).
70. In this it is similar to the so-called new labor history, which also jettisoned a
professional paradigm (that of industrial relations experts) for a more humanistic approach
to the past. See Brody, The Old Labor History and the New: In Search of an American
Working Class, 20 LAB. HIST. 111 (1979); Ernst, Working-Class Heroes and Others, 17
REV. AM. HIsT. 586 (1989).
71. See C. GEERTz, THE IrMRPrETATION oF CuLTuREs 30 (1973).

72. Gordon, supra note 64, at 1056.
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as fodder for footnotes and a makeweight for arguments fashioned out of
present-day concerns. By showing that antitrust must be thought of as part
of a larger and historically contingent culture, and by reminding us that
antitrust has been, is now, and will remain the project of social movements
seeking to define the boundary between state and society, they make a
persuasive claim for the attention of those who would formulate a public
interest in antitrust law.

